






















































The	 negative	 effects	 of	 corruption	 are	 now	 thought	 to	 be	manifold,	 from	 growing	 control	 of	
political	 institutions	 by	 small	 groups	 of	 economically	 powerful	 people,	 to	 fiscal	 and	
environmental	crises	and	widening	inequality.	Corruption	is	said	to	be	holding	millions	of	people	
in	poverty	and	reducing	the	possible	rate	of	economic	growth	as	well	as	the	distribution	of	its	
benefits.	 Furthermore,	 corruption	 is	 also	 now	 widely	 seen	 to	 be	 emasculating	 the	 state	 and	
private	institutions	that	have	traditionally	been	the	vehicles	for	addressing	poverty	and	bringing	







marker	of	 the	process	of	 under‐development,	 or	whether	 it	 is	 a	 condition	which	will	 only	 be	
eliminated	after	development	has	happened:	that	is,	corruption	is	a	phase	of	actual	development.		
	


















negative	 effects	 of	 capitalist	 development	 (including	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 as	 well	 as	









War	 II	 international	 enthusiasm	 for	 development	 continues	 unabated.	 Post‐war	





















space	 for	corruption	on	a	scale	and	 in	forms	which	were	unprecedented;	 in	 the	 latter,	nation‐






















While	 the	 case	 studies	 presented	 below	 detail	 the	 connection	 between	 development	 and	
corruption	in	our	epoch,	it	is	important	first	of	all	to	show	the	intimate	and	necessary	connection	
between	 the	 two	 in	 some	 historical	 perspective.	 In	 brief,	 the	 simple	 argument	 is	 that,	 in	 the	
nineteenth	century,	corruption	was	understood	to	be	embedded	within,	and	inseparable	from,	
development.	Corruption	is	the	process	of	under‐development,	rather	than	the	condition	of	being	




While	 it	 is	 now	 fashionable	 to	 elide	 development	 and	 economic	 growth	 with	 such	 claims	 as	
‘development	is	more	than	economic	growth’,	the	modern	idea	of	development	commenced	as	a	
proposed	 antidote	 to	 some	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 rapid	 commercial	 expansion	 (that	 is,	 economic	







of	 solution.	 Instead	 of	 simply	 accepting	 the	 positive	 and	 negative	 effects	 of	 capitalism’s	
















acting	compulsively:	 ‘Accumulate,	 accumulate!	This	 is	Moses	and	 the	Prophets’	 in	Karl	Marx’s	
well‐known	punning	aphorism.	By	contrast,	trusteeship	and	trustees	are	required	to	make	forms	
of	 intentional	 development	 happen,	 and	 especially	 to	 counter	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	
spontaneous	development.	Trusteeship	 is	not,	however,	 inevitable,	and	at	various	moments	 is	
unable	to	stay	the	deleterious	effects	produced	by	the	drive	to	accumulate	spontaneously.	Since	
the	1960s	at	least,	and	particularly	since	the	1980s,	the	contempt	in	which	trusteeship	came	to	
be	 held	 created	 space	 for	 a	 prolonged	 attack	 on	 state	 practices.	 The	 thrust	 of	 what	 is	 often	
inaccurately	labelled	neo‐liberalism	(Stedman	Jones	2014)	attached	itself	to	this	contempt	in	the	
guise	of	‘freeing	up	markets’,	‘letting	the	market	rule’	and	other	similar	slogans.	State	planning	to	
restrain	 deleterious	 forms	 of	 private	 accumulation,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 reduce	 unemployment	 and	
under‐employment,	came	under	sustained	global	attack.		
	






balance	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 had	 been	 shifted,	 either	 against	 the	 few	 of	 the	
aristocracy,	or	the	many,	of	the	people’	(1996:	93).	And	as	Cowen	and	Shenton	(1996:	99)	go	on	


























has	 created	 some	 subsequent	 confusion	 for	 many	 commentators	 (vis‐à‐vis	 ‘the	 Washington	






markets	 to	 international	 competition.	 Given	 that	 the	 industrial	 countries	 already	 contained	


















An	 important	 document	 that	 presented	 the	World	 Bank’s	 prescription	 for	many	 countries	 in	




which	criticised	 the	1980	Lagos	Plan	 accepted	by	African	heads	of	 state	 for	 a	 continuation	of	
‘inward‐looking’	policies.	The	Bank’s	approved	position	would	come	to	be	known	by	 the	term	
‘economic	liberalisation’.	Subsequently	this	description	was	swallowed	under	the	omnibus	neo‐


















that	 private	 enterprises	 were	 invariably	more	 efficient	 than	 government	 agencies.	Wherever	
possible,	 existing	 public	 enterprises,	 including	marketing	 boards	 and	 transportation	 facilities	
(seaports,	railroads,	airports),	should	be	privatised.	The	state	marketing	agencies	were	a	special	
focus	 of	 attack,	 backed	 by	 the	 fashionable	 claim	 often	 associated	 with	 the	 work	 of	 British	
economist	Michael	Lipton	(1977),	 that	official	setting	of	domestic	agricultural	prices	shaped	a	









through	 increased	 exports	 of	 agricultural	 crops,	 especially	 coffee,	 did	 not	 necessarily	 match	
household	need	for	income	to	maintain	or	increase	consumption.	When	coffee	prices	fell,	as	they	
had	done	from	the	late	1970s	after	the	Brazilian‐frost	induced	boom	of	1975‐1977,	households	
acted	 rationally	 in	 pulling	 out	 coffee	 bushes	 and	 planting	 maize	 for	 immediate	 and	 locally	
marketed	consumption.	But,	for	the	Kenyan	government,	such	action	was	anathema.		
	


















countries,	 the	 Berg	 Report	 could	 not	 ‘deal	 with	 specific	 programs	 or	 problems	 of	 individual	
countries’	(World	Bank	1981:	1).	Nevertheless,	it	soon	became	obvious	that	the	economist	Berg	
was	unable	to	adequately	include	determinations	of	political	and	state	power	in	his	analysis	and	


















which	had	dominated	since	 Independence	 in	1964,	he	also	represented	the	drive	of	a	 further,	









most	 notably	 forests	 which	 included	 important	 game	 reserves	 and	 water	 catchment	 areas	
(MacWilliam	2012).	Faced	with	declining	living	standards	and	widespread	poverty,	the	regime	
turned	 increasingly	 authoritarian	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	 represented	 the	 activities	 of	 the	
KAMATUSA	and	politically	allied	bourgeois	(MacWilliam	2012).	As	the	national	economy	entered	
a	prolonged	downturn,	representation	of	this	new	layer	was	increasingly	portrayed	as	corruption	







From	1978,	 private	 banks	multiplied	 as,	 first,	 non‐Kikuyu	 staff	were	 promoted	
within	 the	 (existing)	 parastatal	 banks	 and	 Kikuyu	 managers,	 excluded	 from	
promotion,	 set	 up	 their	 own	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 …Then,	 second,	
Kalenjin‐owned	banks	were	created	…	the	‘political	banks’	were	the	latter	group	
of	Kalenjin	owned	and/or	sponsored	banks	which	were	often	managed	by	Kenya	
Asians	 and	 Kenya	 or	 expatriate	 European	managers.	 Given	 that	 the	 late‐1980s	















the	most	 important	members	of	Kenya’s	political	 leadership,	 the	 IMF	exerted	pressure	on	 the	











Kenya’s	 ‘transformation’,	 if	 it	 can	 be	 called	 such,	 was	 not	 unique	 when	 compared	 to	 other	
countries	in	the	region.	By	1989,	the	World	Bank	had	published	a	‘long‐term	perspective	study’	
on	Sub‐Saharan	Africa—Sub‐Saharan	Africa:	From	Crisis	to	Sustainable	Growth—concluding	that	








in	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 independence,	 the	 past	 few	 years	 have	 seen	 an	 alarming	
reversal	in	many	African	countries	where	deindustrialization	seems	to	have	set	in.	
With	 export	 volumes	 barely	 growing	 at	 all	 since	 1970,	 Africa's	 share	 in	world	
markets	has	fallen	by	almost	half.	(World	Bank	1989:	2)	
	
Perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	World	 Bank	 President	 Barber	 Conable	 pinpointed	 the	 inadequacy	 of	
public	institutions	as	‘a	root	cause	of	weak	economic	performance’	(Conable,	in	World	Bank	1989:	
xii).	He	 then	 introduced	a	 theme,	 first	 raised	 the	year	before	 in	an	assessment	of	 ten	years	of	








especially	 women,	 to	 take	 greater	 responsibility	 for	 improving	 their	 lives—






Governance	 reform	 was	 thus	 formulated	 out	 of	 the	 earlier	 failure	 of	 measures	 proposed	 to	






ten	years	of	 structural	 adjustment	 lending.	 The	Bank	 concluded	 that	 ‘severe	 institutional	 and	







publication,	 governance	 was	 described	 in	 a	 form	 which	 emphasised	 its	 connection	 with	
development,	as	 ‘…	the	manner	in	which	power	is	exercised	in	the	management	of	a	country’s	





noted,	 by	 the	mid‐1990s	 ‘Japan’s	 International	Cooperation	Agency	 (JICA)	 began	 to	 link	 good	
governance	with	participatory	development,	democratisation	and	economic	liberalisation’.	Citing	
Australia’s	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade,	Larmour	provides	another	official	definition	
of	 good	 governance	 as	 ‘open,	 transparent,	 accountable,	 equitable	 and	 responsive	 to	 people’s	
needs’	(1998:	1‐2).	
	
For	 present	 purposes,	 the	 1992	 enlargement	 of	 the	 description	 contained	 an	 even	 more	
significant	 feature.	 World	 Bank	 and	 other	 official	 concern	 for	 governance	 was	 now	 moving	
beyond	its	roots	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa’s	1980s	‘crisis	of	development’.	As	the	World	Bank’s	1992	





In	 Eastern	 Europe,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 legal	 system	 conducive	 to	 private	 sector	
development	is	a	severe	impediment	to	privatization	and	new	investment.	In	some	
Latin	 American	 countries,	 rapid	 decentralization	 has	 outstripped	 systems	 of	
accountability	 and	 civil	 service	 institutions	 at	 the	 provincial	 or	 state	 and	 local	
government	 levels,	 which	 has	 in	 turn	 increased	 already	 unsustainable	 fiscal	
deficits.	(World	Bank	1992:	4)		
	




















Leading	 economic	 thinkers	 like	 Frederich	 Hayek,	 Milton	 Friedman,	 Ronald	 Coase	 and	 others	
(mostly	of	the	Chicago	school	but,	as	we	will	see	shortly,	notably	from	Harvard	too)	had	developed	
an	economics	extolling	the	political	and	economic	virtues	of	free	markets.	Institutional	advisers	






fresh	 from	 Latin	 America	 linked	 up	 with	 leading	 politicians	 including	 Boris	 Yeltsin,	 Anatoly	
Chubais	 and	Yegor	Gaidar	 as	well	 as	 a	 handful	 of	 senior	 apparatchiks,	 to	bring	market‐based	
reforms	 (Wedel	 1998).	 And,	 instead	 of	 the	 World	 Bank—which	 had,	 via	 its	 auto‐critique	 of	












even	 though	 there	 would	 be	 some	 economic	 dislocation	 (and	 thus	 some	 fall	 in	 output	 and	
incomes),	the	sooner	market‐based	processes	got	working,	the	sooner	economic	growth	would	
recover.	 ‘The	 economic	 strategy	…	 argues	 for	 a	 rapid,	 straightforward	 and	 sharp	 program	 of	









privatisation	project	was	 thus	 thought	 to	be	 about	 creating	 capitalist	 property	 firstly	without	















enrich	 themselves.	 By	 the	 mid‐1990s,	 mass	 privatisation	 on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale	 had	




…	 the	 defining	 feature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 business—particularly	 big	














3. The	 loans	 for	 shares	 arrangement	 (LFS)	 where	 key	 state	 assets,	 especially	 natural	










Union.	 These	 just	 were	 not	 the	 markets	 that	 late	 twentieth	 century	 US‐trained	 economists	



























Gusinsky,	 Yakunin,	 and	 Khodorkovsky	 had	 their	 property	 confiscated	 or	 positions	 of	 power	









redistribution	and	 looting,	which	was	reflected	 in,	among	other	 things,	 severe	health	 impacts.	
Death	rates	soared	and	infant	mortality	increased	rapidly.	By	1996,	the	World	Bank	was	already	
(implicitly)	announcing	the	failure	of	the	policy	of	shock	therapy.	It	cited	estimates	that,	during	





people	 in	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Union	 by	 unchecked	 processes	 of	 spontaneous	 or	 immanent	
development:	
	
Beyond	 these	 essential	 technical	 and	 institutional	 elements	 of	 transition,	 this	
Report	is	about	people.	It	is	about	how	people	can	be	protected	from	the	loss	of	

















Political	 developments	 and	economic	 reforms	 are	 closely	 interrelated	 ...	 reform	







development.	 Former	 Harvard	 Institute	 for	 International	 Development	 economist	 Andrei	




























state,	 political	 power,	 legitimacy	 and	 social	 organisation	 (Ostry,	 Loungani	 and	 Furceri	 2016;	





governments	 function	 effectively	 and	 achieve	 economic	 progress.	 In	 the	





























More	 recently	 still,	 Francis	 Fukuyama	has	 revisited	 (and	 recanted	much	 of)	 his	 earlier	 thesis	
about	 the	 inevitability	 of	 progress	 and	 democracy	 under	 capitalism.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 mounting	
evidence	 of	 illiberal	 and	 oligarchical	 nations	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 Africa	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	
Fukuyama	(2006,	2014)	has	recognised	the	fragility	of	democracy	and	democratic	institutions.	
After	 breaking	 with	 the	 neoconservatives	 in	 Washington,	 following	 unsuccessful	 military	
incursions	in	the	Middle	East,	Fukuyama	has	shifted	from	urging	US	foreign	policy‐makers	of	the	




actively	 promote	 democracy.	 In	 engaging	 with	 the	 shift	 of	 development	 policy	 toward	





governance)	 through	 greater	 administrative	 capacity	 and	 autonomy	 from	 political	 forces	











Finally,	 Jeffrey	 Sachs	 (2017),	 who	moved	 on	 rapidly	 from	 Eastern	 Europe,	 notably	 playing	 a	
leading	role	in	the	development	of	the	UN’s	Millennium	Development	Goals,	has	also	expressed	
growing	 scepticism	 about	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 benefits	 of	 unfettered	 global	 capitalism.	
Sachs	 too	 has	 followed	 the	 move	 in	 development	 policy	 toward	 state	 capacity	 building	 and	
collective	 government	 action.	 But,	 given	 the	 problems	 with	 turning	 plans	 for	 intentional	
development	such	as	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	into	action,	he	is	now	interested	in	how	
to	make	 development	 happen,	 extending	 his	 interest	 to	 political	 and	 civil	 society.	 Similar	 to	




The	 parties	 I	 most	 admire	 are	 the	 social‐democratic	 parties,	 and	 they’re	
disappearing	 in	 most	 places,	 because	 their	 sociological	 base,	 which	 was	 trade	












the	 contradictory	 poles	 of	 capitalist	 development	 are	 now	 the	 subject	 of	 active	 policy	 and	
academic	debate.	And	these	debates	echo	and	rhyme	with	earlier	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	
century	 debates	 about	 progress	 and	 development	 under	 capitalism.	 As	 Cowen	 and	 Shenton	
speculated	 in	 the	 mid‐1990s	 when	 contemplating	 how	 intentional	 development	 might	 be	
reformulated	 in	 the	 face	 of	 non‐development,	 labelled	now	variously	 as	 failed	 states,	 illiberal	
capitalism	or	grand	corruption:	
	
The	 main	 vehicle	 will	 be	 an	 amalgam	 of	 official	 and	 non‐governmental	 aid	
organizations	whose	task,	in	assuming	the	mantle	of	development,	is	to	confront	
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